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Abstract— This paper explores the motives behind the formation 
of intra-African regional integration agreements (RIAs). We aim 
to see whether rent seeking can be identified as a statistically 
significant driving force of African integration. The traditional 
reason for economic integration, the static and dynamic effects, 
predict no, or even a negative effect on welfare. Moreover, many 
of the new regionalism theories are conditional on strong 
economic integration. Rent seeking behavior and the regime 
boosting hypothesis are two exceptions. Not only can they 
credibly explain the proliferation of African trade agreements in 
the absence of a positive effect on welfare, they can also explain 
the lack of progress in clearing away the many obstructions to 
regional trade. However, in spite of the anecdotal evidence, we 
cannot find convincing evidence that rent seeking behavior has 
been a motive for African integration. Corruption is insignificant, 
regardless of the way of testing, or the corruption indicator used. 
The factors that seem to explain African integration are all 
geographical, not economic nor political. 
Keywords Regional Integration; Rent seeking; Africa. 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Regional integration has been very popular in Africa over 
the last 50 years. Every country is part of at least one regional 
integration agreement (RIA), and on average an African 
country is member of four agreements [1]. Yet, it is hard to 
reconcile this enthusiasm for regional integration with its 
results. Practically all indicators (apart from the number of 
agreements) show that African economies are barely integrated 
at all. Tariff reduction schemes are backlogged, rules of origin 
are extremely restrictive and cross-border transportation 
facilities are either inadequate, or missing altogether. As a 
result, the level of intra-regional trade of most RIAs barely 
exceeds the 10% (relative to around half of all trade in NAFTA 
or the EU-27), and in some cases it even fell after singing the 
agreements [2]. 
What is especially confusing is that the reasons for African 
integration have never been very compelling to begin with. 
First of all, most African countries do not produce any of the 
products that are of interest to neighboring countries. The bulk 
of African trade is with developed economies, in particular 
with the European Union. The African trade patterns are not 
complimentary and static analysis warns that integration will 
most likely result in trade diversion and hence lower welfare. 
The dynamic effects of RIAs are also unlikely to be strong. 
Creating a unified African market means circumventing or 
breaking down many barriers to trade: a deficient 
transportation network, different legal systems, different 
languages... even in the best case scenario, the costs of unifying 
these markets outweigh the benefits in the short and medium- 
long term [3]. African integration has been found to have no 
effect on intra-African trade [4], and studies that did find an 
effect concluded that any increases were driven by trade 
diversion [5 and 6]. Berthelon [7] concluded that in the best 
case, integration among developing countries only raises the 
growth rate of the biggest country. All of this makes it difficult 
for traditional economic theory to explain the proliferation of 
African free trade agreements. Similarly, most of the theories 
lumped together under the banner of new regionalism lack 
persuasiveness. Locking in reform, raising policy credibility, 
enhancing regional cooperation, strengthening regional 
stability all require strong economic integration, or are impeded 
by the lack thereof [8]. 
The rent seeking hypothesis and rent seeking behavior are 
two exceptions. They can account for the strong interest in 
integration in the absence of a positive effect on welfare, as 
well as for the failure in breaking down any of the barriers to 
trade. The regime boosting hypothesis states that governments 
in a tenuous political position will use the act of signing RIAs 
as a way to gain legitimacy abroad and attract funding [9].  
Regional integration can also be used to set up domestic rent 
extracting mechanisms. The agreements bestow extensive 
powers on the negotiating parties, which combined with the 
absence of an increase in welfare creates an ideal environment 
for lobbying and bribery. 
While there exist ample examples of RIAs misused in this 
way, the evidence of rent seeking being a driving force of 
integration remains largely anecdotal. The goal of this paper is 
to see whether rent seeking can be identified as a statistically 
significant influence on the decision to enter a free trade 
agreement in Africa. In doing so, it builds on papers by 
Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff [10], Baier and Bergstrand 
[11], Endoh [12], Wu [13] and Márquez-Ramos, Martínez-
Zarzoso, and Suárez-Burguet [14] that try to determine the 
reasons behind the formation of regional integration 
agreements. 
This paper differs from those listed above mainly in two 
ways. Firstly, the focus of this paper is intra-African integration 
attempts and problems that are particular to this continent. 
Secondly, with the exception of Wu [13], the papers above 
study regional integration in a bilateral setting, focusing on 
agreements between country pairs. However, the structure of 
African RIAs does not lend itself to be analyzed in this way 
since most agreements involve more than two partner 
countries. Moreover, the bilateral approach ignores the 
problem of overlapping agreements. As a solution, we propose 
using a multilateral approach: regressing whether or not 
country x is member of agreement z on the characteristics of 
both. It means looking at integration from the point of view of 
individual country trying to decide whether to join a certain 
RIA. 
II. RENT SEEKING AS A DRIVING FORCE OF INTEGRATION 
In the regime boosting hypothesis the government’s main 
worry is strengthening its political power. By attending 
regional summits, singing protocols, etc., the government seeks 
recognition of its legitimacy abroad, which it then uses to 
attract foreign aid and support. For example, in SADC
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national projects were often disguised as regional ones and got 
funded with donor money [9]. 
Besides capturing international rents, RIAs can also be used 
to appropriate domestic rents. They have a big impact on a 
substantial part of the economy, and their negotiations bestow 
extensive powers to politicians and bureaucrats. They can be 
used to influence market structure, conditions that have to be 
met to import or export goods, etc. Furthermore, the 
complexity of the agreements allows corrupt officials to easily 
hide their actions. This combined with the near zero-sum-game 
outcome of integration creates an ideal breeding ground for 
political lobbying, corruption and bribery. 
Take for example ECOWAS
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, where the regional 
cooperation tax had been set up to compensate countries for the 
loss of tariff revenues on intra-regional trade. The system set 
up turned out to be highly discriminatory, providing 
opportunities only for firms working in the formal sector. It 
also led to fraudulent behavior because the compensation 
computations were based on highly unreliable data [15]. 
A similar situation could be found in UDEAC
3
 with the 
single tax (tax unique). The official goal of this tax was to 
foster and protect intra-regional production by limiting 
domestic and import taxes relative to extra-regional goods. 
Selected goods from membership countries were taxed once 
when crossing the border at their respective single tax rate and 
would then be exempt from all other indirect taxes and import 
duties. Again, this set up resulted in an extremely 
discriminatory system, where not only each firm, but also each 
good within a firm could be subject to its own tax rate. As a 
result, the setting of each tax rate was subject to numerous 
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strategic considerations and had little to do with economic 
logic [16]. 
Rent seeking is also used as an explanation for the lack of 
progress in regional integration. Vested interests in the 
informal economy -which often surpasses national boundaries- 
oppose formal treaties that would undo many of the 
transnational inefficiencies and disparities that are lucrative to 
them [9]. However, given the potential for profitable 
opportunities, rent seeking can just as well be a force driving 
integration agreements. Grossman and Helpman [17] work out 
a model where the sectors that stand to lose and those that 
stand to gain both lobby the government and seek to influence 
its policy decision using political contributions. They find that 
even in situation were the net effect on welfare is zero or 
negative, a RIA is a politically feasible option if the level of 
corruption is high enough. However, the effect of corruption 
will depend on the relative size of the country. 
Ornelas [18] expands the model of Grossman and Helpman 
by adding a rent-destruction effect. He argues that RIAs lead to 
more competition between countries, which reduces the returns 
to high external tariffs for the import competing industries. 
Because lobbies take this into account when deciding whether 
or not to support a FTA, the viability of welfare-reducing free 
trade agreements is severely impaired. The higher the 
government’s preference for rents, the stronger this rent-
destruction effect will play. As a result, welfare-reducing RIAs 
are only possible at intermediate levels of corruption. If social 
welfare were the only thing of importance, the government 
would never consider closing welfare-reducing FTAs. With 
high preference for rents the rent-destruction effect dominates 
and lobbies would not support the FTA. 
Maggi and Rodríguez-Clare [19] see RIAs purely as a way 
for the government to limit the power of lobbies and eliminate 
certain sources of rents. In their model, the preference of the 
government for contributions versus welfare also has a non-
monotonic effect on the likelihood of entering into an 
agreement. The government would only join a RIA if they care 
about welfare as well as rents. If they care too much about 
rents, they would never consider entering into an agreement. 
On the other hand, if the government was not concerned about 
rents at all the lobbies wouldn’t be able to exert any pressure to 
start with. 
Endoh [12] works out a model detailing the effect of 
changes in the quality of governance on the formation of RIAs 
and tests its implications. While his model is also based on 
Grossman and Helpman [17], the effect of a change in 
governance is reversed: better governance raises the probability 
of closing a RIA. The main reason for this is that he uses a 
different government objective function; Arguing that the 
inability to tax is also a sign of weak governance, import tariffs 
are treated the same as contributions for lobbyists. 
Nevertheless, the effect of governance on the willingness to 
enter an agreement is not parameter independent and its sign is 
unclear. 
Following Mansfield et al. [10] and Baier and Bergstrand 
[11], Endoh tests his hypotheses in a strict bilateral setting. A 
dataset of over 6000 country-pairs is compiled, listing whether 
or not those countries are in a RIA and a number of shared 
characteristics: combined GDP, difference in GDP, sum of the 
governance indicators, on what continent both countries lie, 
etc. Using this dataset in logit regressions, he finds 
confirmation of the posited positive effect of quality of 
governance on the likelihood of closing a RIA. 
Wu [13] examines the determinants of deep regional 
integration. To do this, she creates a variable listing the deepest 
level of integration a country is engaged in per year . Using a 
ordered probit estimation procedure, this variable is then 
regressed on measures of trade, political, business, and price 
uncertainty and various other country specific characteristics. 
As one of the measures of political uncertainty, she uses 
corruption, reasoning that countries marked by high corruption 
will use RIAs “to end trade risks brought about by the 
capricious behavior of domestic government representatives” 
[13, p.167]. In other words, she posits a positive correlation 
between corruption and the level of integration. Regressing the 
latter on Transparency International’s corruption perceptions 
index produces a coefficient with the right sign, but it is small 
and insignificant. However, when she subsequently collapses 
the dependent variable to a dummy variable, the coefficient on 
corruption rises both in absolute value and in significance. 
While these results reject Wu’s premise, they fit within the 
rent seeking hypothesis. According to the latter, government 
officials use RIAs to attract and extract rents, leading to more 
agreements. However, they oppose deep integration since that 
might cut of their access to certain sources of rents. Combining 
both leads to a non-linear effect of corruption on the level of 
integration, but a positive effect on the number of agreements. 
Our paper differs from those above in a number of ways. 
First of all, it is centered on African integration and focuses on 
issues common to African RIAs that may be less present 
elsewhere. The second difference is the way RIAs are 
analyzed, which is discussed in the next section. 
III. ECONOMETRIC SPECIFICATION 
Two econometric approaches have been used to determine 
what factors drive regional integration attempts. Mansfield et 
al. [10], Baier and Bergstrand [11], Endoh [12] and Márquez-
Ramos et al. [14] use a bilateral approach. This entails 
regressing whether or not two countries have formed a RIA on 
a number of shared characteristics of both countries. For 
example, it allows you to test whether differences in level of 
development or the distance between the two of them will 
influence the decision to form a RIA. 
The drawback of the bilateral approach is that normally 
only shared characteristics can be taken into account. The 
characteristics of the countries themselves or those of other 
partner countries are left out. The last one is especially 
problematic in the context of African integration, where 
multilateral RIAs are the norm. Treating these as if they 
collection of bilateral agreements is a vast oversimplification. 
For example, it implies that you analyze the decision of 
Rwanda and Burundi to join the CEPGL
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, while disregarding 
the fact that the Democratic Republic of Congo is also a partner 
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in the agreement. Furthermore, the bilateral approach has no 
way to deal with overlapping agreements, a problem that is 
endemic in African integration. 
Wu [13] on the other hand uses a unilateral approach: she 
regresses whether or not country x entered a RIA in year t on 
the characteristics of that country in that year. This can be used 
for example to test whether landlocked nations or relatively 
more corrupt governments are more likely to join a RIA. The 
main drawback is that the characteristics of the partner 
countries cannot be taken into account. 
The multilateral approach solves the omitted variable bias 
of both approaches. Instead of looking at country-country pairs 
like the bilateral approach, it studies country-RIA pairs instead. 
The dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating whether 
or not a certain country x is a member of RIA z and can be 
regressed on information that is country-specific, RIA-specific 
or both. It can be used to regress the decision to enter a RIA on 
the average size of member countries, the level of corruption in 
the candidate country or the fraction of countries with a similar 
colonial history. 
IV. DATA  
A. Regional Integration 
In order to test the link between corruption and integration, 
data was collected on the founding of, and accession to 
regional integration agreements in Africa. This was done using 
the Regional Integration Knowledge System [2], and the 
webpages of the regional trade agreements themselves. The 
thirteen FTAs and customs unions incorporated are: AMU, 
CEN-SAD, ECOWAS, GAFTA and UEMOA in the West and 
North of Africa; CEPGL, UDEAC, ECCAS, EAC in central 
Africa; and COMESA, SACU, RIFF and SADC and in the 
South and East of Africa
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. Taken together, they cover 53 
African countries. 
This dataset was used to create three dependent variables to 
be used in the unilateral, bilateral and multilateral regressions, 
respectively: 
•  RIAunix,t indicates whether country x signed an agree-
ment in year t or any of the previous four years; 
• RIAbix,y signals if country x and country y are currently 
members of the same agreement; 
•  RIAmultix,z shows whether county x has joined RIA z. 
B. Explanatory variables 
Several control variables are taken into consideration. Most 
of them come from the aforementioned papers studying the 
determinants of regional integration. They can be divided into 
three groups: political, geographical or economic. 
There are six geographical variables: 
•  Landlocked is expected to have a positive sign, since the 
countries that are cut off from the world markets would be 
                                                          
5 AMU = African Maghreb Union; CEN-SAD = Community of Sahel-
Saharan States; GAFTA = Greater Arab Free Trade Area; UEMOA = West 
African Economic and Monetary Union; UDEAC = Customs and Economic 
Union of Central Africa; EAC = East African Community; SACU = Southern 
African Customs Union and RIFF = Regional Integration Facilitation Forum 
more willing to close RIAs. In the bilateral regressions there 
are two landlocked variables: landlocked (either) is one if at 
least one of the countries is landlocked; landlocked (both) 
when both of them are. 
•  Island is included because it is found to have a significant 
negative influence on the decision to enter RIAs in Wu [13]. 
•  SSA indicates if a country lies in Sub Saharan Africa. 
•  The remaining three geographical variables are indicators 
of the distance between countries. For each variable, we expect 
that the closer the countries are, the stronger their inclination to 
form a RIA is. In the bilateral regressions, adjacency indicates 
whether the two countries neighbor one another. In the 
multilateral regressions, it expresses if the country neighbors 
any members of the RIA. Natural is the inverse of the distance 
between capitals of the country pair. In the multilateral 
regressions it is replaced by the minimum distance to the 
capital of any member of the RIA. 
There are two types of economic variables: 
• The first economic variable is the difference in the 
capital/labor ratios between countries (K/L diff). The bigger the 
difference, the higher the expected trade creation effects, and 
the more likely an agreement is. To control for endogeneity we 
use the capital/labor values of 1981. The data comes from the 
Extended Penn World Tables [20]. 
• The other economic variables are GDP and 
GDP/capita, which come from the World Development 
Indicators. They are included to capture two conflicting effects. 
On the one hand, the smaller a country is, the bigger the 
potential advantages to scale are. On the other hand, the 
distributional effects of RIAs imply that large countries 
(hegemonies) stand to gain more. 
Five political variables are taken into consideration: 
•  We have three subjective indicators of corruption at our 
disposal: Control of Corruption (CoC) produced by the World 
Bank [21], Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI) and the International Country Risk 
Guide’s index of corruption (ICRG). A high value corresponds 
to low levels of corruption. For the sake of comparability, they 
are rescaled to lie between -1 and 1. Some regressions also 
incorporate the difference in, average of, or squared levels of 
corruption (respectively CoC diff, CoC av and CoC
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, etc.). 
•  In the bilateral regression, colony is a dummy variable 
that is one when the countries have the same colonial 
background. In the multilateral regressions, it represents the 
fraction of countries in the RIA with the same colonial 
background. Colonial history also serves as a proxy for the 
official language of a country. 
•  Polity indicates the level of democracy versus autocracy 
in a country: -10 being a completely totalitarian regime and 10 
a completely democratic one. Mansfield et al. [10] find that it 
has a positive effect on the likelihood to enter a RIA. The data 
comes from the Polity IV dataset [22]. 
•  GATT/WTO is a dummy variable indicating when a 
country joined a RIA and is used in the unilateral regressions. 
•  Openness, the last political variable, is measured as the 
fraction of exports and imports to GDP. Wu [13] uses it to 
control for the fact that the more open a country is, the more 
the government would be willing to stabilize trade flows using 
RIAs. 
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
A. Unilateral analysis 
In the unilateral analysis RIAuni is regressed on the average 
value of corruption in the preceding five years and a number of 
controlling variables (table 1). The model was estimated using 
a random effects logistic estimator, but the results remain the 
same when estimated with a simple logistic model. 
Since high values of the indicators correspond with low 
levels of corruption, the rent seeking hypothesis and regime 
boosting hypothesis predict negative signs for these variables. 
While CoC and CPI both have negative coefficients, those of 
ICRG are positive. However, none of them are significant even 
at the 10% level. Including the squared values of corruption 
raises the values of all coefficients. In keeping with what 
Ornelas (2005) predicts the squared values are positive, but all 
the corruption variables remain insignificant. 
The coefficients of the controlling variables follow a 
similar pattern: most of them are insignificant, and a lot of 
them have signs that run counter to what was expected. The 
only two significant variables are per capita GDP and SSA: 
more development countries are significantly less likely to join 
RIAs, as are Sub Saharan countries. 
B. Bilateral analysis 
We estimate the effect of corruption in two different ways 
in the bilateral regressions. In the first, RIAbil is regressed on 
the level of corruption both countries, similar to how Mansfield 
et al. [10] controls for the level of democracy. The underlying 
assumption is that an increase in corruption has the same effect 
regardless of the level of corruption of the potential partner 
country. The second approach is the one used by Baier and 
Bergstrand [11] and Endoh [12] and entails regressing RIAbil 
on the average level of corruption in both countries. It assumes 
that the total level of corruption in both countries is of 
importance, regardless of the individual levels. As an 
additional explanatory variable, the difference in corruption is 
also included. 
The model is estimated using a logistic regression, with the 
standard errors corrected for non-nested two-way clustering at 
the country level (table 2). This is implemented using a 
procedure outlined in Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller [23].  
To control for endogeneity only predated values are used. 
Two exceptions are CoC and CPI, which are only available 
since the mid nineties. Moreover, to avoid the selection bias 
problems the CPI values of 2007 are used, since this is the first 
year where the index is available for every African country. 
This time, ICRG and CoC have a negative sign, while 
CPI’s coefficient is positive. Like in the unilateral regressions, 
none of them are significant. Using the average corruption 
levels instead does not change this. The only variable that has a 
consistent sign for all three corruption variables is the absolute 
difference in corruption between the two countries: the higher 
it is, the lower the likelihood that the countries are members of 
the same RIA. Nevertheless, the variable is only significant 
when the ICRG index is used. 
The main variable that explains why some countries are in a 
RIA together is their distance from each other. Natural (the 
inverse of the distance between them) is positive and 
significant at the 1% level and adjacency is significant at 10% 
when using the ICRG index. The only other controlling 
variable that is significant (at 10%) is the difference in the 
capital-labor ratios. However, contrary to what is expected and 
to what is found in other papers its coefficient is negative. This 
means that those countries that are less likely to have trade 
creating effects from RIAs are more likely to be in a RIA. A 
possible explanation for this aberration is that we are ignoring 
the influence of other partner countries. If a lot of countries 
with roughly the same capital-labor ratios have joined a RIA to 
facilitate trade with a country whose capital ratio does differ, 
this would bias the coefficient downwards. If so, the 
multilateral analysis should resolve this inconsistency. 
C. Multilateral regressions 
The multilateral framework combines both the unilateral 
and bilateral analyses, regressing whether or not a country is a 
member of a certain RIA on the characteristics of that country 
and the agreement. Because the composition of some RIAs has 
changed over time (SADC and COMESA among others), it is 
important to use the characteristics of the RIA at the time of 
joining in order to make the correct comparison. 
Take for example the average GDP of a RIA. If a certain 
country x is a member of the RIA, the average is computed 
over all members of the RIA at the time of joining, excluding x. 
On the other hand, if x has never been a member, the average is 
computed over all countries that are, or have been a member. 
The same rule was applied when computing the minimum 
distance to a member of the agreement, whether a country is 
adjacent to a member, the average level of corruption, the 
fraction of countries with a the same colonial history, the 
average difference in capital-labor ratios and average 
difference in corruption. Similar to the bilateral analysis, 
standard errors are corrected for non-nested clusters: on 
country level and on RIA level (table 3). To avoid problems of 
endogeneity, predated values are used when possible. 
Once again, the signs of the coefficients on the level of 
corruption in a country are not stable. Both ICRG and CoC 
now have positive signs, while CPI’s is negative. The only 
corruption variable with a consistent sign is the difference in 
corruption. The interpretation of this variable differs slightly 
from that of the bilateral regressions, because the difference is 
computed in levels and not in absolute values. Its positive sign 
means that for a given level of corruption in country x, the 
higher corruption in the (other) member countries is, the higher 
the probability that the country x will join the RIA. However, it 
is only significant for the CoC index. 
The distance between countries remains an important factor 
in trying to explain African integration, in particular whether a 
country is adjacent to (other) members of agreement. Sub 
Saharan African countries are significantly less likely to enter 
into a RIA, while island nations are more likely. While the 
difference in capital-ratios is still negative, it has become 
insignificant, resolving in part the aberration found in the 
bilateral regressions. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This paper explores the motives behind the proliferation of 
regional integration agreements in Africa. Static and dynamic 
analyses predict high welfare reducing effects, and most new 
regionalism theories rely on strong economic integration. Rent 
seeking behavior and the regime boosting hypothesis on the 
other hand can theoretically explain both the growth of African 
agreements as well as their lack of progress in liberating intra-
African trade. They state that governments will use trade 
agreements to gain access to national and international sources 
of rents, making RIAs politically feasible even when the effect 
on social welfare is negative.  
Empirical evidence of corruption as a driving force has 
been mostly anecdotal, and the goal of this paper is to find out 
whether it could be identified as a statistically significant 
factor. This estimated in three ways: unilaterally, from the 
point of view of an individual country; bilaterally, looking at 
agreements between pairs of countries; and multilaterally, 
studying the reasons for a country to join a particular RIA.  
However, we cannot find convincing evidence that 
corruption has been a driving force of African integration. The 
signs on the coefficients of corruption change depending on the 
estimation model, and all but a few of them are insignificant. 
The only determinants of African integration that can be 
identified are geographical ones. The closer countries are, the 
higher the probability they are members of the same RIA. The 
same holds for countries that lie in Northern Africa and island 
nations. Economic and political factors on the other hand do 
not seem to play a role. A result that stands in stark contrast 
with the predictions of theoretical models [12, 17, 18 and 19], 
and with world-wide empirical studies where all three factors 
have been found to play a role [10, 11, 12, 13 and 14]. 
For future research it would be interesting to see whether 
the relative size of a country influences the effect of corruption 
on the willingness to close RIAs, as Grossman and Helpman 
[17] predict. Moreover, the current tests did not take into 
account the possibility that the effect of corruption is non-linear 
(cf. [18] and [19]). 
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Table 1 - Unilateral regressions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Landlocked  0.1089 -0.0482 -0.8269 -0.665 -0.5773 -0.6606 
 
(0.3897) (0.3664) (0.5665) (0.4879) (0.6766) (0.6218) 
SSA  -0.9286 -0.8049 -2.383 -2.3229 -3.7994 -3.8704 
 
 (0.5442)*  (0.5181)  (1.0239)**   (0.8759)***   (1.3454)***   (1.2135)*** 
Island nation  0.9888 0.5071 -0.726 -0.4324 0.9372 0.7013 
 
(1.0029) (0.8948) (1.3439) (0.9101) (1.6940) (1.1171) 
GDP/cap  -0.108 -0.1046 -0.3084 -0.2794 -0.4149 -0.4148 
 
(0.0734) (0.0707)  (0.1385)**   (0.1261)**   (0.2066)**   (0.1963)** 
GDP growth  -0.036   -0.0822   -0.1234   
 
(0.0490)   (0.0834)   (0.1208)   
Polity II  0.0183 0.0037 0.0127 0.0215 0.0789 0.0868 
 
(0.0333) (0.0307) (0.0560) (0.0479) (0.0748) (0.0646) 
GATT/WTO  -0.1093   -0.8299   -0.4003   
 
(0.4048)   (0.6986)   (1.0794)   
Openness  0.1722   -0.3941   -0.4318   
 
(0.4470)   (0.5235)   (0.6866)   
ICRG  0.2639 0.5006         
 
(0.5362) (0.5362)         
ICRG2   0.3238         
 
  (0.8960)         
CoC      -0.4150 -0.1840     
 
    (1.0608) (1.5487)     
CoC2       0.8495     
 
      (2.2485)     
CPI          -2.014 2.1753 
 
        (2.1762) (4.8703) 
CPI2           6.015 
 
          (6.5591) 
Constant  0.3823 0.1744 3.2694 1.5929 3.6303 2.8056 
 
(0.7512) (0.5609)  (1.5279)**   (0.9657)*  (2.4874) (1.7068) 
Observations  192 209 122 149 90 108 
Nr of Countries  35 36 44 50 41 50 
loglikelihood  -117.52 -127.6 -61.7 -76.73 -42.43 -49.6 
Random effects logistic regression of RIAuni on corruption and controlling variables. Standard errors in parentheses.  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Table 2 - Bilateral regressions 
 
Table 3 - Multilateral regressions 
                (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Adjacent  1.1766 1.2584 0.9014 0.9653 0.9864 1.065 
 
Adjacent  1.6796 1.4945 1.6662 1.6514 1.6324 1.6336 
 
 (0.6862)*   (0.6793)*  (0.6223) (0.6769) (0.6484) (0.6892) 
  
 (0.3800)***   (0.4480)***   (0.3694)***   (0.3698)***   (0.3528)***   (0.3588)*** 
Natural  127.645 127.3523 154.3082 153.4988 163.972 163.1013 
 
min Distance  -0.2743 -0.3904 -0.4564 -0.4585 -0.4589 -0.4479 
 
 (39.0336)***   (41.1642)***   (34.7185)***   (34.2681)***   (36.0723)***   (35.5971)*** 
 
(0.2620) (0.2400)  (0.2032)**   (0.1987)**   (0.2052)**   (0.1976)** 
landl. - either  -0.3799 -0.3203 -0.2679 -0.3376 -0.2752 -0.3348 
 
Landlocked  -0.2113 -0.0099 -0.0871 -0.0896 -0.0278 -0.0745 
 
(0.3647) (0.3433) (0.3194) (0.3133) (0.3062) (0.3031) 
  
(0.5839) (0.7696) (0.4290) (0.4309) (0.4342) (0.4514) 
landl. - both  0.1045 0.1577 -0.568 -0.6001 -0.573 -0.5931 
 
Island  1.503 1.1695 1.4759 1.4487 1.6103 1.5189 
 
(0.6586) (0.6307) (0.4380) (0.4366) (0.4107) (0.4155) 
  
(0.9630) (0.9873)  (0.5968)**   (0.6113)**   (0.5227)***   (0.5534)*** 
GDPa  0.0202   0.0115   0.011   
 
SSA  -1.0354 -1.5762 -1.171 -1.2171 -1.3683 -1.349 
 
(0.0175)   (0.0182)   (0.0182)   
  
 (0.5671)*   (0.3690)***   (0.5417)**   (0.5469)**   (0.5041)***   (0.5193)*** 
GDPb  0.0009   0.0003   -0.0022   
 
K/L diff  -0.0185 -0.0203 -0.0774 -0.1005 -0.0203 -0.0638 
 
(0.0068)   (0.0067)   (0.0070)   
  
(0.3367) (0.3170) (0.1725) (0.1828) (0.1668) (0.1836) 
GDP av    0.0018   -0.024   -0.0217 
 
GDP  -0.0262 -0.0227 -0.0117 -0.0137 -0.009 -0.012 
 
  (0.0178)   (0.0229)   (0.0209) 
  
(0.0398) (0.0407) (0.0256) (0.0263) (0.0288) (0.0290) 
GDP diff    0.0175   0.0199   0.0159 
 
GDP RIA  -0.0106 -0.0163 -0.019 -0.0186 -0.0184 -0.0186 
 
  (0.0129)   (0.0133)   (0.0127) 
  
(0.0202) (0.0233) (0.0162) (0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0160) 
K/L diff -0.382 -0.379 -0.2512 -0.2278 -0.29 -0.2729 
 
Colony  0.6227 0.4177 0.7931 0.7737 0.8244 0.8445 
 
(0.2407) (0.2256)* (0.1481)* (0.1555) (0.1524)* (0.1523)* 
  
(0.8896) (0.7416) (0.5630) (0.5653) (0.5359) (0.5351) 
colony  -0.194 -0.1974 0.39 0.4028 0.3018 0.3215 
 
Polity  0.0026 -0.0287 0.0173 0.0168 0.0344 0.0308 
 
(0.2925) (0.3008) (0.2588) (0.2659) (0.2664) (0.2651) 
  
(0.0053) (0.0232) (0.0340) (0.0338) (0.0332) (0.0325) 
ICRG A  -0.371           
 
ICRG  0.0142 0.0452         
 
(0.5201)           
  
(0.4786) (0.5994)         
ICRG B  -0.0244           
 
ICRG RIA  0.5875           
 
(0.3076)           
  
(1.1339)           
ICRG av    -0.806         
 
ICRG diff    0.0053         
 
  (0.7541)         
  
  (0.1290)         
ICRG diff    -0.8485         
 
CoC      0.5019 0.5027     
 
   (0.5126)*          
  
    (0.4094) (0.4552)     
CPI A      -0.854       
 
CoC RIA      -0.3032       
 
    (0.9495)       
  
    (0.3705)       
CPI B      -0.1875       
 
CoC diff        0.1886     
 
    (0.9363)       
  
       (0.0659)***      
CPI av        -0.8323     
 
CPI          -0.2705 -0.1118 
 
      (1.4943)     
  
        (0.8213) (0.8509) 
CPI diff        -0.7209     
 
CPI RIA          -0.4786   
 
      (1.0297)     
  
         (0.1268)***    
CoC A          0.3414   
 
CPI diff            0.0951 
 
        (0.6436)   
  
          (0.0974) 
CoC B          0.5315   
 
Constant  -1.1903 -0.6401 -0.9373 -0.6469 0.4831 -0.7583 
 
        (0.4802)   
  
(0.9762) (0.5932) (0.7266) (0.7768) (1.2569) (0.9577) 
CoC av            0.8437 
 
Observations  306 223 530 530 530 530 
 
          (0.7825) 
 
loglikelihood  -102.86 -72.4 -162.62 -162.48 -162.41 -163.28 
CoC diff            -0.2995 
 
Logistic regressions of RIAmulti on corruption and controlling variables. Standard deviations are corrected for 
clusters on country-level and RIA-level (in parenthesis). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%  
          (0.5223) 
 Constant  -15.5359 -15.2836 -19.1885 -18.8033 -19.5578 -19.2959 
 
 
 (4.6943)***   (4.8560)***   (4.0100)***   (3.8999)***   (4.2541)***   (4.2065)*** 
       Observations  561 561 1081 1081 1081 1081 
        likelihood  -284.61 -283.64 -539.01 -538.51 -538.62 -539.42 
        Logistic regression of RIAbi on corruption and controlling variables. Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected 
for clusters on the level of each country A and country B. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. 
         
